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Misallocation of resources across firms leads to lower aggregate productivity. In this
paper, we provide new estimates of manufacturing productivity differences across
countries and establish by how much they would be reduced if such misallocation were
eliminated. Using World Bank survey data for formal manufacturing firms in 52 low- and
middle-income countries, we show that manufacturing productivity would increase by an
average of 62%, but productivity gaps relative to the United States would remain large.
We also find that lower-income countries do not have more to gain from reducing
misallocation, as efficiency of resource allocation is uncorrelated with income levels.
Keywords: Productivity, Resource Allocation, Cross-Country Comparisons
1. INTRODUCTION
Total factor productivity (TFP) differences account for much of the income dif-
ferences across countries [Caselli (2005); Hsieh and Klenow (2010)]. However,
measured TFP will reflect not only firm productivity but also any misallocation
of resources due to distortions in output and factor markets.1 Because improving
the efficiency of resource allocation across firms is a different challenge than
improving firm productivity, it is important to disentangle these two aspects of
measured TFP for a sector or economy.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we determine the contribution of
resource misallocation to cross-country differences in manufacturing productivity
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2 ROBERT INKLAAR ET AL.
for a wide range of low- and middle-income countries. Second, we investigate
whether countries with lower income levels would benefit more from improving
resource allocation. Earlier contributions to the literature suggest that eliminating
resource misallocation would lead to substantial productivity gains, and that the
gains would be larger in poorer countries. In a seminal article, Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) demonstrated that eliminating misallocation across manufacturing plants
in China and India would lead to productivity gains that are larger than in the
US, and Bartelsman et al. (2013) found less efficient resource allocation in three
Eastern European economies with lower income levels than in Western Europe
or the United States. More generally, both studies illuminate how micro-level
distortions can have negative macro-level implications.
In the model introduced by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), distortions in firm size
and capital/labor ratios lead to variation in the marginal products of capital and
labor across firms, within industries. By equalizing marginal products across firms,
the productivity gains from eliminating resource misallocation can be quantified.
In this paper, we use this methodology to investigate the importance of resource
misallocation in the manufacturing sector for a much broader sample of countries
than has been done so far. To implement this methodology, we use firm-level data
from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES), a standardized survey of firm-
level financial and economic data for a wide range of low- and middle-income
economies. Our sample covers 52 countries around the year 2005,2 and the set of
countries span much of the development spectrum, from a GDP per capita level
of 0.52 percent of the U.S. level (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) to 52
percent of the U.S. level (Slovenia).3
We find that most countries would benefit considerably from reducing the de-
gree of resource misallocation to the level seen in the United States, as the average
efficiency of resource allocation is 67% of that in the United States. To put these
findings into perspective, we estimate relative manufacturing productivity levels,
building on and extending the approach of Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012).
Relative TFP across countries is computed as relative value added per worker
divided by relative factor inputs (physical and human capital) per worker. To mea-
sure relative value added, we estimate relative output prices using not just prices
of consumption and investment goods but also prices of exports and imports.4
Relative factor inputs are computed using economywide data on relative wages
and rental prices. We find that even if resource misallocation were eliminated,
cross-country TFP differences in manufacturing would remain large: the average
observed productivity would rise from 23% to 37% of the U.S. level. Although this
represents a substantial reduction of the productivity gap, it is clear that resource
misallocation across firms cannot fully account for low aggregate productivity
levels.
Our second finding is that we do not find a significant correlation between the
efficiency of resource allocation in manufacturing and income levels across our
set of countries. This finding suggests that even the richer countries in our sample
could still benefit considerably from measures to reduce resource misallocation.
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RESOURCE MISALLOCATION IN MANUFACTURING 3
Brazil is an example of this: the World Bank classifies it as an “upper middle-
income” country, yet it has a wildly inefficient tax system that distorts capital
allocation.5 In our data, Brazil has an income level in the top quartile of countries,
whereas its efficiency of resource allocation is in the bottom half. The formerly
Communist countries in Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria, also tend to have
above-average income levels but below-average levels of efficiency of resource
allocation, which could reflect their legacy of central planning.
We establish the robustness of these results by considering a range of alternative
measurement choices. The main alternative measure of the efficiency of resource
allocation is covariance between firm size and labor productivity, favored by
Bartelsman et al. (2013). This covariance measure is positively correlated with
our measure, based on the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) methodology, and also shows
no significant relationship with income levels. Additional alternatives are to con-
sider different types of distortions separately, to vary the elasticity of substitution
between product, to vary the treatment of the basic survey data, and to account for
the large differences in sample size across countries. Our findings remain robust
throughout.
Before we proceed, it is helpful to place our results in a broader context. The
methodology we follow in this paper is, in the terminology of Restuccia and
Rogerson (2013), an indirect approach to analyzing misallocation, in which the
full gap between marginal costs and marginal products of capital and labor is
labeled as resource misallocation. This indirect approach contrasts with direct
approaches, which analyze the impact of specific frictions—such as financial
frictions [Buera et al. (2011); Moll (2014)]—on resource allocation and aggregate
productivity. As opposed to such studies, our approach encompasses the effect
of many possible frictions but, as a result, cannot be directly tied to specific
institutions. Furthermore, by attributing the full gap between marginal costs and
marginal products to misallocation, we may be overstating the importance of
misallocation: adjustment costs, experimentation by firms with new technologies,
and measurement error are all included in our measure of misallocation. The
extent of such overstatement, though, will be mitigated by measuring misallocation
relative to the United States.
Our analysis relies on the WBES data set, because it allows us to compare a
wide range of countries. However, the World Bank’s sample frame is restricted
to (formal) manufacturing firms with at least five employees, so the survey does
not capture informal and smaller formal manufacturing firms. Studying the formal
sector is of interest, as firms in this sector operate in an environment that is
directly influenced by the labor, capital, and output market institutions and policies
that could lead to resource misallocation.6 Rodrik (2013) finds unconditional
productivity convergence in formal manufacturing and argues that this finding is
important, as it suggests that a larger formal manufacturing sector will help lower-
income countries to catch up. At the same time, this feature of our data means that
we cannot reflect on the allocation of resources between the formal and informal
manufacturing sectors.
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4 ROBERT INKLAAR ET AL.
Our focus on manufacturing also means that we ignore the type of between-
sector misallocation emphasized by Vollrath (2009), Fernald and Neiman (2011),
and Gollin et al. (2014). All find that particular sectors, such as agriculture, may
employ an inefficiently large part of the labor force. In addition, there may be
misallocation within other sectors. For instance, Adamopoulos and Restuccia
(2014) show that distortions to farm size can account for part of the cross-country
productivity differences in agriculture. Given this broader literature, our finding
that misallocation in (formal) manufacturing does not decrease with rising income
levels does not automatically carry over to other sectors or the economy as a whole.
Because the agricultural sector and informal manufacturing and services tend to
shrink with higher levels of development [e.g., ILO (2013)], it could well be that
resource misallocation (in a broad sense) and development levels are correlated.
Finally, in the Hsieh–Klenow (2009) model, firm technology is considered
exogenous and thus is unrelated to the distortions of factor markets that give
rise to resource misallocation. Yet from the broader literature on productivity
[e.g., Syverson (2011)], we know that firms engage in technology-enhancing
investments, such as spending on research and development (R&D). Furthermore,
financial frictions can lead to suboptimal investment in long-run projects such as
R&D spending [Aghion et al. (2010)], thus leading to a link between resource
misallocation and firm technology. Within this broader context, our study sheds
light on the importance of resource misallocation for cross-country productivity
differences and our result that misallocation across (formal) manufacturing firms
is not correlated with income levels suggests that resource misallocation can be a
more subtle force than one might think.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
When there are perfect factor and product markets, aggregate productivity reflects
only technological differences across countries. But in the presence of distortions
that drive a wedge between the marginal product and marginal cost of production
factors, aggregate productivity will also reflect resource misallocation [Basu and
Fernald (2002); Fernald and Neiman (2011)]. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) argue that
misallocation of resources between firms within industries can be important in
explaining TFP differences across countries. Applying their model to firm-level
data allows us compute a measure of the efficiency of resource allocation, RA,
defined as the ratio of observed TFP (A) and (hypothetical) efficient TFP (A∗).7
The level of TFP in country c relative to the United States can then be decomposed
as
AcUS = A∗cUS × RAcUS (1)
We provide a brief sketch of the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model; see their work
for a more extensive exposition. Firm i produces output Y in a monopolistic com-
petition setting with inputs of labor, L, capital, K, and firm-specific productivity,
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A, using a Cobb–Douglas production function:
Yi = AiKαi L1−αi (2)
Firms not only are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity, as in Melitz
(2003), but also face idiosyncratic distortions of their input and output prices. Two
types of distortions are introduced: output distortions, which affect the quantity of
production while leaving the input mix unaffected, and capital distortions, which
affect the use of capital relative to labor. These distortions are modeled as taxes
on output and capital, leading to the following expression for firm profits π :
πi = Pi (1 − τY i) Yi − wLi − (1 + τKi) rKi (3)
where P is the output price of the firm, w is the wage rate, r is the rental price of
capital, τY is the output distortion, and τK is the capital distortion.
In the model’s monopolistic competition setting, profit maximization leads
firms to charge a fixed markup over marginal cost, determined by the elasticity of
substitution σ . The marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) and the marginal
revenue product of capital (MRPK) are given by the partial derivatives of the
revenue function multiplied by the inverse of the markup to correct for rents:


















= r (1 + τKi)
(1 − τY i) (5)
Equations (4) and (5) show that the marginal revenue products of labor and
capital are affected not only by the wage rate and the rental price of capital
but also by distortions. Capital distortions affect the marginal revenue of capital,
whereas output distortions affect the marginal revenue products of both labor and
capital.
From (4) and (5), we can derive direct expressions for the output and capital
distortions:


















Firms where the labor share in value added is less than the output elasticity
of labor thus face greater output distortions and firms with a lower capital–labor
ratio face greater capital distortions. A firm facing large distortions will have high
marginal costs and will thus have to charge high prices. This drives a wedge
between the firm’s physical productivity (referred to as TFPQ) and its revenue
productivity (TFPR). Using observed data on revenues and costs, we can compute
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As (8) shows, TFPR is influenced by both types of distortions. Furthermore,
variation in TFPR across firms within an industry reflects only the impact of the
distortions, not firm technology. We can determine firm-level TFPQ, which is not
affected by distortions, by assuming an elasticity of substitution σ to impute prices












Observed industry (and thus also manufacturing) productivity is determined
not only by firm TFPQ, but also by the variation in TFPR across firms, and thus
by distortions.8 Conversely, efficient industry (and manufacturing) productivity is
determined solely by firm TFPQ levels. The ratio of observed to efficient TFP
is thus our measure of the efficiency of resource allocation, which we express
relative to the efficiency of resource allocation in the United States as in (1).
We also consider an alternative measure of misallocation, advocated by Bartels-
man et al. (2013). This is based on a decomposition of industry labor productivity






siωi = ω¯ +
∑
i
(si − s¯) (ωi − ω¯) (10)
Industry labor productivity is a weighted average of firm labor productivity
(ωi), with employment shares as weights, si = Li/
∑
i Li . This can be written as
the unweighted average labor productivity (indicated by the upper bar) plus the
covariance between firm size (in terms of employment) and firm labor productivity.
If this covariance term is positive, it indicates that more productive firms are also
larger, and Bartelsman et al. (2013) present a model in which greater distortions to
resource allocation lead to lower observed covariances. This measure is a useful
alternative because it does not rely on the assumptions of the more extensive
theoretical framework of Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
Implementing (6)–(9) requires firm production data and data on wages and the
rental rate of capital, which are discussed in the next section. We also need to
assume a value for the elasticity of substitution (σ ) among products. We follow
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and choose an elasticity parameter of 3, though we
also experiment with a higher value of 5.9 Finally, benchmark values of the
output elasticity of capital and labor are required to measure distortions. These
benchmark elasticity parameters should come from data that are not distorted and
thus reflect the true characteristics of each industry’s technology. Following Hsieh
and Klenow (2009), we use elasticity parameters from the relatively less distorted
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100515000668
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Groningen, on 31 Mar 2017 at 17:05:27, subject to the Cambridge Core
RESOURCE MISALLOCATION IN MANUFACTURING 7
U.S. economy as benchmark values; see the next section for details and Table A.1
for the parameters we use.
3. DATA AND MEASUREMENT
For the estimation of cross-country manufacturing TFP and the efficiency of
resource allocation, we use two sets of data. The first set consists of manufacturing
output and input levels, based on cross-country price comparisons, to measure
aggregate manufacturing productivity levels relative to the United States in 52
countries, and is discussed in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 discusses the WBES, which
provides the firm-level financial and economic data that we use to estimate the
efficiency of resource allocation within the formal manufacturing sector of each
country.
3.1. Data for Manufacturing Total Factor Productivity Levels across
Countries
Manufacturing TFP levels are computed as the ratio of manufacturing value added
per worker and factor inputs per worker. Manufacturing value added in national
currency is available from UN National Accounts data, but to make this comparable
across countries, we need relative prices of manufacturing output.10 Manufacturing
value added equals the payments to labor and capital, and to make these factor
payments comparable across countries, we need the relative prices of labor and
capital and the factor elasticities to combine these into an overall price of factor
inputs.
Ideally, relative output price estimates would be based on producer price data,
but the lack of dedicated survey data means that alternative approaches have
been followed in the literature. When focusing only on manufacturing, some have
opted to use exchange rates to compare output from different countries, assuming a
relative price of one [e.g., Rodrik (2013)]. An argument in favor of this approach is
that many manufactured products are traded and thus more exposed to the pressures
of the Law of One Price (LOP). But this argument is not fully convincing, given
the systematic deviations from LOP even for products that are internationally
traded [Burstein and Gopinath (2014); Feenstra and Romalis (2014)] and the
very limited trade in some manufactured products, such as ready-mixed concrete
[Syverson (2008)].
The main alternative approach is to use relative prices collected as part of
the International Comparison Program (ICP). These prices form the basis of the
GDP PPPs disseminated by the World Bank (2008) and are prices of consump-
tion and investment goods and services. Relative output prices for manufacturing
are estimated by selecting and combining the prices of goods that are made by
manufacturing industries, as in Sørensen and Schjerning (2008), Van Biesebroeck
(2009), and Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012). Given its broad application, it can
be seen as the standard approach, yet it has drawbacks as well. Most importantly,
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8 ROBERT INKLAAR ET AL.
the prices of goods consumed or invested domestically do not take into account the
prices of exported products, whereas they are influenced by the prices of imported
goods. As detailed in the Appendix, we combine ICP price and expenditure data
for consumption and investment goods with relative prices of exports and imports
from Feenstra and Romalis (2014) and data on industry output, exports, and
imports.
To compute manufacturing productivity levels, we need prices of inputs in ad-
dition to the price of manufacturing output. We follow the approach of Herrendorf
and Valentinyi (2012) and assume that economywide (relative) wages and rental
prices apply to manufacturing as well. In effect, this assumes that production
factors are mobile across sectors. Our wage measure for the majority of countries
is based on the same principle as Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012), namely the
country-average wage level adjusted for differences in schooling.11 The data source
for this measure is the Penn World Table, version 8.0 [PWT; see Feenstra et al.
(2015)], and this wage measure is for the year 2005 and covers total labor com-
pensation.12 For a few countries, we use economywide wages that are not adjusted
for differences in schooling, also from PWT and for 2005. For the remainder of
countries, we compute the median manufacturing wage from the WBES, based
on labor compensation and the number of workers at each manufacturing firm.
For those countries, we use overall inflation (of the GDP deflator) between the
survey year and 2005 (relative to the United States) to estimate wage levels for
2005.
The relative price of capital input is computed as the relative rental price. The
concept is based on Hall and Jorgenson (1967), as adapted by Jorgenson and
Nishimizu (1978) for cross-country comparisons. The relative rental price pK ,
















)− log (ucapIa)] (11)
where ucaj = ij + δa − dpaj is the user cost of capital, with i the nominal
interest rate, here taken as the lending rate from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics,13 δ the asset-specific geometric depreciation rate, dpaj the price change
of asset a in country j, and caj = kcaj /
∑
a kcaj . Here kcaj = ucajpIajKaj and Kaj
is the capital stock of asset a in country j. In this expression, a bar over a variable
indicates the arithmetic mean across countries. This means that each country is
compared with a (hypothetical) average country to ensure that the resulting relative
price measure does not depend on the base country that is chosen [see Caves et al.
(1982)].14
Capital stocks, asset deflators, and deprecation rates are the same as used for
the PWT, and these data are described in detail in Feenstra et al. (2015). Capital
stocks are built up from investment by asset using the perpetual inventory method,
based on time series going back as far as 1950. These investment series are partly
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taken from the OECD National Accounts database and EU KLEMS, and partly
estimated based on ICP expenditure data and the commodity flow method.
The final elements we need for computing relative productivity (as well as for
computing distortions; see (6)–(8)) are the elasticity parameters for weighting the
prices of labor and capital. We assume that the output elasticities of capital and
labor in each manufacturing industry are well approximated by the U.S. cost shares
in the same industry. This follows the approach of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), where
variations in observed factor shares relative to U.S. output elasticities reflect misal-
location of resources.15 We use industry labor and capital cost shares published by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as part of the Major Sector Multifactor
Productivity program. The BLS capital share also covers capital income from land
and inventories, so it represents the full contribution of capital to value added.16
3.2. Data for Misallocation Measurement
The main data source for measuring misallocation within countries is the World
Bank’s Enterprises Survey (WBES), an ongoing survey that collects firm-level data
worldwide. The major advantage of the WBES survey is that it has a systematic
data collection process using standardized survey instruments across a broad range
of countries. The data set thus provides comparable data that are unique in their
extensive country coverage.
It is important to note that the World Bank sample frame consists of formal
manufacturing firms with at least five employees. Because the smallest formal
firms and all informal manufacturing firms are not part of the data, our measure of
misallocation might underestimate overall resource misallocation in manufactur-
ing. Yet it is hard to make more concrete statements on this topic, because reliable
data on even the total number of informal workers and their contribution to GDP
are still scarce.17
Sampling for the WBES is conducted using stratified sampling procedures
to ensure representativeness. The first step is determining the number of industry
groups that are to be covered across each major sector. For manufacturing, industry
grouping is based on the 2-digit ISIC classification. The size of the economy de-
termines the number of industries to be covered, and the most important industries
are selected for sampling. In the second stage, the sample size is chosen to ensure
a representative sample for the proportion of firms and the average sales in the
industry. Further stratification is based on firm size and geographical location to
select the firms that are covered by the survey.18
WBES data collection started in 2002 and different countries have been covered
in different years. Panel data are available for some countries, but the country
coverage of the panel data set is limited. For the analysis in this paper, we therefore
construct a cross-sectional data set to cover the maximum number of countries
around the year 2005. When a country has participated in multiple surveys, we
use the data for the year with the largest number of firm observations.
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From the WBES data, we select manufacturing firms with complete data on total
production, cost of intermediate inputs, capital stock, and labor inputs. Firm value
added is measured as the difference between sales and the cost of intermediate
inputs. The cost of intermediate inputs is the sum of energy costs (fuel, electricity,
and others), the cost of raw materials, and overhead and other expenses. To account
for differences in hours worked and human capital, we use labor cost rather than
employment as the measure of labor input. The capital stock is measured as the
book value of assets, summed across the two categories “machinery, vehicles
and equipment” and “land and buildings.” From the set of firms with data on all
variables, we remove loss-making firms with negative value added. We also follow
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and remove observations that are in the top and bottom
percentiles of the two types of distortions and of TFPQ within each country data
set.
In our “cleaned” data set, a number of industries have very few usable obser-
vations compared with the original sample, with the largest loss of data being
due to missing capital stock data. To make sure that the final sample is not too
different from the original (representative) sample, we exclude industries if they
have fewer than five observations or if the number of usable observations is less
than half the original number of observations. In a second screening, we exclude
all countries with fewer than 40 observations or where fewer than 40 percent of
the original observations remain. These cutoff points should ensure that countries
are excluded for which the sample would be much less representative than the
original. For sensitivity analysis, we also consider three alternative treatments of
the basic WBES data:
1. Excluding the top and bottom 2.5% of observations, rather than the top 1% of
observations. This reduces the sample from 52 to 44 countries.
2. Excluding all loss-making firms, rather than only those where losses are large enough
to lead to negative value added. This reduces the sample to 40 countries.
3. Excluding industries when there are fewer than 10 observations, rather than industries
with fewer than 5 observations. This reduces the sample to 44 countries.
Our baseline data set covers 52 countries; see Table 1 for the complete list.
The countries are mostly low- and middle-income countries, with a median GDP
per capita of $ 3,164 in 2005 (in PPP-converted US dollars from PWT 8.0); the
country with the highest income is Slovenia ($ 21,967) and the one with the lowest
income is the Democratic Republic of the Congo ($ 221).19 Table 1 also provides
the number of firm observations per country. The average sample size is close
to 400, but the sample size differs considerably across countries. Whereas large
countries such as India, Brazil, and China have well over a thousand observations,
smaller ones such as Estonia and Swaziland have only around 40 observations, our
cutoff point. Because the misallocation estimates are likely to be more reliable for
countries with a larger number of observations, we will also consider the robustness
of our results using weighted regressions and correlations, giving countries with
fewer observations a lower weight.
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TABLE 1. Results and data description by country
Efficiency Efficient
Country Acronym Year Observations TFP RA TFP
Average 392 0.23 0.67 0.37
25th percentile 87 0.12 0.58 0.20
75th percentile 556 0.34 0.79 0.49
1 Angola AGO 2006 148 0.22 0.71 0.31
2 Argentina ARG 2010 514 0.26 0.90 0.29
3 Azerbaijan AZE 2009 62 0.20 0.79 0.25
4 Bangladesh BGD 2007 1199 0.09 0.74 0.12
5 Bolivia BOL 2006 162 0.18 0.62 0.29
6 Botswana BWA 2006 71 0.16 0.51 0.31
7 Brazil BRA 2003 1360 0.41 0.62 0.66
8 Bulgaria BGR 2007 347 0.22 0.35 0.63
9 Burundi BDI 2006 71 0.04 0.64 0.06
10 Chile CHL 2010 562 0.48 0.61 0.79
11 China CHN 2003 1203 0.18 0.70 0.26
12 Colombia COL 2010 508 0.35 0.85 0.41
13 Congo, DR COD 2006 123 0.12 0.55 0.22
14 Croatia HRV 2007 199 0.80 0.58 1.38
15 Ecuador ECU 2006 182 0.18 0.71 0.25
16 Egypt EGY 2004 538 0.21 0.51 0.41
17 Estonia EST 2009 40 0.54 0.62 0.87
18 Ghana GHA 2007 243 0.07 0.72 0.10
19 Guinea GIN 2006 78 0.06 0.97 0.06
20 India IND 2002 1563 0.21 0.62 0.34
21 Indonesia IDN 2003 329 0.15 0.97 0.15
22 Iraq IRQ 2011 405 0.27 0.50 0.54
23 Kenya KEN 2007 364 0.19 0.45 0.42
24 Lao PDR LAO 2009 99 0.12 0.66 0.18
25 Madagascar MDG 2009 88 0.08 0.64 0.13
26 Malawi MWI 2005 118 0.10 0.49 0.20
27 Malaysia MYS 2002 562 0.38 0.45 0.84
28 Mali MLI 2007 232 0.15 0.70 0.21
29 Mauritania MRT 2006 57 0.25 1.01 0.25
30 Mauritius MUS 2005 86 0.45 0.50 0.90
31 Mexico MEX 2010 928 0.54 0.60 0.90
32 Moldova MDA 2009 53 0.13 0.61 0.21
33 Mongolia MNG 2009 99 0.12 0.78 0.15
34 Morocco MAR 2004 691 0.34 0.78 0.44
35 Mozambique MOZ 2007 240 0.13 0.26 0.50
36 Namibia NAM 2006 56 0.37 0.69 0.54
37 Nepal NPL 2009 59 0.06 0.64 0.09
38 Nigeria NGA 2007 849 0.14 0.67 0.21
39 Pakistan PAK 2002 670 0.08 0.29 0.28
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TABLE 1. Continued
Efficiency Efficient
Country Acronym Year Observations TFP RA TFP
40 Peru PER 2010 443 0.34 0.79 0.43
41 Philippines PHL 2003 526 0.14 0.68 0.21
42 Senegal SEN 2007 194 0.16 0.79 0.20
43 Serbia SRB 2009 69 0.33 0.74 0.45
44 Slovenia SVN 2009 56 0.65 0.88 0.74
45 South Africa ZAF 2007 591 0.44 0.76 0.58
46 Sri Lanka LKA 2004 298 0.19 0.49 0.39
47 Swaziland SWZ 2006 42 0.18 0.71 0.25
48 Tanzania TZA 2006 207 0.10 0.81 0.12
49 Thailand THA 2004 1242 0.16 0.79 0.20
50 Uganda UGA 2006 232 0.17 0.58 0.29
51 Vietnam VNM 2005 1055 0.09 0.87 0.10
52 Zambia ZMB 2007 265 0.14 0.83 0.17
Notes: “Acronym” is the three-letter ISO code used in the figures. “Year” indicates the year in which the WBES
survey that we use was conducted. “Observations” indicates the number of firm observations used. “TFP” shows the
measured TFP level (United States = 1). “Efficiency RA” shows the efficiency of resource allocation (United States
= 1) and “Efficient TFP” is measured TFP divided by the efficiency of resource allocation.
4. RESULTS
In this section we provide evidence for our two main results. First, we show that
removing distortions would lead to substantial gains in TFP, but that the gaps in
TFP levels relative to the United States would remain substantial. Second, we
show that the efficiency of resource allocation is unrelated to a country’s income
level; i.e., it is not necessarily the lower-income countries that have most to gain
from removing distortions to firm size and capital accumulation.
Table 2 summarizes the efficiency of resource allocation relative to the United
States, defined in (1) as observed TFP divided by efficient TFP. Recall that efficient
TFP levels would prevail if output distortions from (6) and capital distortions from
(7) were removed. Aside from the baseline measure, the table also provides a range
of alternatives. All measures refer to the formal manufacturing sector in (up to)
52 countries and are expressed relative to the United States. The United States is
not one of the countries in our sample, but a helpful benchmark case, as Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) show that it is an economy with relatively small distortions. We
therefore use the results on the difference between observed and efficient levels
from their study.20
The table shows the unweighted average efficiency of resource allocation across
the countries, as well as the 25th and 75th percentile values. The first line shows
the baseline measure, computed by removing both output and capital distortions.
The average country has an efficiency of resource allocation of 67% with an
interquartile range between 58 and 79%, all relative to the United States. Lines
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TABLE 2. Efficiency of resource allocation in formal manufacturing (United
States = 1)
Average [25th–75th]
1 Baseline measure 0.67 [0.58–0.79]
Single distortion measures
2 Only output distortion 0.72 [0.64–0.84]
3 Only capital distortion 0.83 [0.75–0.92]
Alternative data choices
4 σ = 5 0.50 [0.38–0.61]
5 Excluding 5% of outliers 0.79 [0.68–0.90]
6 Excluding all loss-making firms 0.72 [0.63–0.81]
7 Excluding industries with <10 obs. 0.64 [0.51–0.75]
Note: Line 1 shows the efficiency of resource allocation [see (1)] based on removing output and capital distortions.
Line 2 considers only the effect of output distortions and line 3 only the effect of capital distortions. In line 4, the
elasticity of substitution is increased from 3 to 5. In lines 5–7, the basic data are processed using more restrictive
criteria; see main text for details. Besides the cross-country average, the 25th and 75th percentile values are shown.
The statistics are based on unweighted data for 52 countries, except for the measures “excluding 5% of outliers”
(44 countries), “excluding all loss-making firms” (40), and “excluding industries with <10 obs.” (44).
2 and 3 consider the effect of removing only output distortions or only capital
distortions. Removing only the output distortion in effect assumes that the observed
firm capital/labor ratios are efficient and that there are only potential TFP gains
from moving to an efficient firm size distribution. The reverse is assumed when
only the capital distortion is removed. The efficiency of resource allocation is
higher for both “single distortion” measures, which is to be expected because
(by assumption) there is less misallocation. The efficiency of resource allocation
of the “only output distortion” measures is, at an average of 0.72, closest to the
baseline measure, which implies that a distorted firm-size distribution is the main
source of resource misallocation. This relates well to Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
who emphasize the importance of the firm size distribution in their analysis of
misallocation in China and India.
The baseline measure of the efficiency of resource allocation assumes an elastic-
ity of substitution between the firms in an industry, σ , of 3. In line 4 this elasticity
is increased to 5, in line with a similar sensitivity check by Hsieh and Klenow
(2009). In lines 5–7, we employ more restrictive criteria in processing the basic
data: excluding 5% of observations as outliers, rather than 2% (line 5); excluding
all loss-making firms instead of only loss-making firms with negative value added
(line 6); and excluding industries with fewer than 10 observations rather than 5
(line 7). Increasing the elasticity of substitution lowers the efficiency of resource
allocation to 0.5, which implies the largest TFP gains from removing misallocation
of all measures considered. Excluding a greater number of outliers or all loss-
making firms leads to higher efficiency of resource allocation than the baseline
measure. Especially for the measure based on more extensive outlier removal, this
is as expected, because firms in the tails of the distributions of the distortions and
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of efficient TFP levels are most affected by the removal of distortions. Still, the
results from removing industries with less than 10 observations (compared with
the baseline cutoff point of 5 observations) show that the efficiency of resource
allocation can also decrease, to 0.64 in that case.
Bartelsman et al. (2013) provide an alternative measure of the efficiency of
resource allocation, namely the size–productivity covariance defined in (10). Based
on our data, we find that the average covariance across the 52 countries is 0.16, with
an interquartile range from 0.02 to 0.29. The generally positive size–productivity
covariances indicate that more (labor) productive firms are typically larger. Indeed,
the average is higher than reported in Bartelsman et al. (2013, Table 1) for the
three formerly Communist countries in Eastern Europe (Hungary, Romania, and
Slovenia), and the 75th percentile value of 0.29 is comparable to the covariances in
Western Europe (France, Germany, Netherlands). Because most of the countries
we cover have income levels lower than those in Eastern Europe—let alone those in
Western Europe—this suggests that there is no straightforward linear relationship
between the efficiency of resource allocation and income levels, a result to which
we will return later.21 We also find that the correlation between our baseline Hsieh–
Klenow (2009) measure and the size–productivity covariance of Bartelsman et al.
(2013) is positive at 0.42 and significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
This is encouraging because the two measures are constructed in very different
ways and rely on different model assumptions regarding market structure and
production technology.
Given a measure of the efficiency of resource allocation, we now ask by how
much TFP would increase relative to the United States if distortions were elimi-
nated. Table 1 presents measured TFP levels in manufacturing for the 52 countries,
constructed using prices of manufacturing output and factor inputs. As the table
shows, the average country in our sample has a TFP level of 23% of that in the
United States, with an interquartile range of 12–34 percent. Overall, the range
of manufacturing TFP levels is comparable to the range of total economy TFP
levels for these countries [Feenstra et al. (2015)], which is in line with the result
of Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012) for their estimates of manufacturing and
economywide TFP levels.
The table also shows the efficiency of resource allocation, for which the sum-
mary statistics were already shown and discussed in Table 2. The table shows that
most countries have an efficiency of resource allocation that is high compared with
their TFP levels (both relative to the United States). There are some countries,
such as Mozambique, Bulgaria, and Pakistan, where the efficiency of resource
allocation is very low, between about one-fourth and one-third of the U.S. level,
indicating that those countries have very large potential gains from reallocating
resources to the more productive firms. Similarly, there are countries with high
levels of efficiency, such as Guinea or Mauritania, where there is little to gain from
resource reallocation, despite very low TFP levels.
For China and India, the two countries that Hsieh and Klenow (2009) focus
on, we can directly compare their outcomes with ours; see Table A.2. The WBES
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surveys for these countries were held in different years than the Census data used
by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), but in both our results and theirs, the efficiency
of resource allocation is higher in China (0.70 in our results, 0.77 in Hsieh and
Klenow, 2009) than in India (0.62 and 0.63). Furthermore, the two countries would
be in the same decile of our cross-country distribution regardless of whether we
used our numbers or theirs. It is comforting that the survey data we rely on to
achieve large cross-country coverage do not lead to very different results than the
more comprehensive Census data of Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
Dividing observed TFP by the efficiency of resource allocation gives efficient
TFP levels, per (1). On the average, the efficient TFP level is 37% of the U.S.
level, which represents a gain over observed TFP levels of approximately 60%.
In some countries, the gains are even larger; for instance, Mozambique would see
its TFP level rise from 13 to 50% because of its very low efficiency of resource
allocation. But all countries (except Mauritania) would gain, as their efficiency of
resource allocation is below one.
But despite the large gains, efficient TFP levels remain well below those of
the United States in all but a few countries, and this is our first main finding.
Although removing distortions would be beneficial for productivity, it would
not—by itself—be enough to eliminate productivity differences. Furthermore,
the summary statistics in Table 2 indicate that this result is robust to the exact
measurement of the efficiency of resource allocation. The only case where the
efficiency of resource allocation was notably smaller than for the baseline measure
was when an elasticity of substitution of 5 was assumed. Using that measure, the
average efficient TFP level would be 52%, which is still well below the U.S. level.
In that case, though, there would also be six countries with higher (efficient) TFP
levels than in the United States, which could indicate that resource misallocation
is given too large a role in at least some countries when a higher elasticity of
substitution is assumed.
A closer look at the results also suggests the second result, namely that the
potential gains from removing distortions are not clearly related to the level of
development, as proxied in Table 1 by observed manufacturing TFP levels. This
is illustrated more specifically in Figure 1, which plots the efficiency of resource
allocation against GDP per capita levels.22 The figure shows no systematic rela-
tionship between the efficiency of resource allocation and GDP per capita levels:
the slope coefficient is 0.023 with a (robust) standard error of 0.041. In other
words, the poorest countries do not gain more from improving the efficiency of
resource allocation; this is our second main finding.
One might argue that—given the variation in the number of firm observations
(see Table 1)—the efficiency of resource allocation is more reliably estimated in
countries with a larger number of firm observations. With data on 52 countries,
the size of our sample is relatively modest, so drastically restricting the criteria
for when a country is included or separately analyzing a group of countries with
relatively more observations would make it more likely that we would find no
significant correlation. So instead, we use weighted regression to ensure that our
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FIGURE 1. The efficiency of resource allocation and GDP per capita. See Table 2 for
the country names corresponding to the acronyms. The solid drawn line is the ordinary
least squares regression line; the dashed line is the regression line where observations are
weighted by the number of firm observations. See also Table 2.
findings are not driven by results for countries with a small number of observations.
As the average number of firm observations is 392, this means that the observation
for Estonia (with the fewest firm responses, 40) gets downweighted by a factor of
ten, whereas the weight on India’s observation (with the largest number of firm
responses, 1,563) is four times larger than in the unweighted case. The dashed
regression line in Figure 1 is based on this weighting and shows how the result
is nearly identical to the unweighted result: the slope coefficient is 0.020 with a
robust standard error of 0.050.
The figure shows how, for example, Brazil ranks in the top quartile of the GDP
per capita distribution, but its efficiency of resource allocation is, at 62%, below
the average level of 67% in our 52-country sample. This fits with the broader
view of Brazil as a heavily regulated economy where misallocation can thrive. For
instance, Brazil ranks 159 out of 189 countries on “Paying Taxes” in the World
Bank’s (2014) Doing Business ranking, because of the high overall tax rate (almost
70% of profits) and 2,600 hours per year needed to comply with the tax code. De
Vries (2014) shows how these high tax rates increase capital distortions (and thus
resource misallocation) in the Brazilian retail trade sector. Muendler (2004) shows
how Brazilian barriers to international trade help low-efficiency firms to remain
in business and, again, Brazil scores poorly on the World Bank’s Doing Business
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ranking for “Trading across borders” (rank 184 out of 189). This example for
Brazil should not be read to imply that a low Doing Business ranking leads to a
low efficiency of resource allocation, but more as an illustration that a high level
of development can coincide with low efficiency of resource allocation. More
generally, the research of Muendler (2004) and De Vries (2014) shows that it is
not straightforward to infer the effect of specific regulations on resource allocation,
given that many other factors can also play a role.
Another example of a country with a relatively high income level, but low
efficiency of resource allocation, is Bulgaria. Its efficiency of resource allocation
of 35% of the United States (cf. Table 1) is among the lowest in our sample, whereas
it is in the top quartile of income levels, with a GDP per capita of 23% of the United
States. More generally, there are five transition countries from Eastern Europe in
our sample (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Moldova, and Slovenia), and these tend
to have above-average income levels but below-average levels of efficiency of
resource allocation. This could reflect their Communist legacy, under which market
forces were not the predominant mechanism of allocating resources. In line with
this interpretation, Bartelsman et al. (2013) show that the transition countries in
their sample had low levels of efficiency of resource allocation (according to
their covariance measure) in the early 1990s, but saw rapid improvements in the
following years. This is a further indication that misallocation of resources is not
primarily influenced or determined by the level of economic development, but
rather shaped by country institutions.
The lack of a relationship between the efficiency of resource allocation and the
level of development is a robust result. The different measures of the efficiency
of resource allocation based on alternative data choices—introduced in Table 2—
show (weighted and unweighted) slope coefficients ranging from –0.005 to 0.039,
with none close to even the 10 percent significance level. Figure 2 illustrates
the relationship between income level and efficiency of resource allocation for
the covariance between size and labor productivity favored by Bartelsman et al.
(2013); cf. (10). The unweighted regression line has a slope of 0.012 with a
robust standard error of 0.025, which is not significantly different from zero. The
weighted regression line has a slope of 0.050 (robust standard error of 0.029) and
is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. The observation for
Malawi (MWI), though, is an influential one and the slope coefficient is no longer
significant (with a coefficient of 0.044 and a robust standard error of 0.029) if that
observation is omitted from the regression.
Figure 3 charts the two single distortion measures against GDP per capita. This
figure shows how, for example, Pakistan (PAK) has a low overall efficiency of
resource allocation because of severe distortions to the firm size distribution, as
reflected in the “only output distortion” measure. Conversely, in Mozambique
(MOZ), capital distortions are more important in driving the overall efficiency of
resource allocation. Malawi (MWI) has a low efficiency of resource allocation
because of output distortions, whereas capital distortions are less of a factor.
This can help explain why Malawi was an influential observation in Figure 2,
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FIGURE 2. The covariance of firm size and labor productivity and GDP per capita. See
Table 2 for the country names corresponding to the acronyms. The solid drawn line is
the ordinary least squares regression line; the dashed line is the regression line where
observations are weighted by the number of firm observations. See also Table 2.
because the size–labor productivity covariance is predominantly influenced by
distortions of the firm size distribution.23 These figures confirm the earlier result
of an insignificant relationship between the efficiency of resource allocation and
GDP per capita. The slope coefficients for the “only output distortion” measure are
even negative at −0.015 (unweighted) and −0.012 (weighted), though far from
statistically significant. The slope coefficients for the “only capital distortion”
measure are positive at 0.040 (unweighted) and 0.018 (weighted) and again not
significantly different from zero. So although we cannot, based on this bivariate
analysis, rule out the possibility that there is some connection between the level of
economic development and the efficiency of resource allocation, we can conclude
that any such connection would need to involve other, potentially more important
determinants of the efficiency of resource allocation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have used survey data covering formal manufacturing firms in a
set of 52 low- and middle-income economies in combination with new estimates
of relative productivity levels in manufacturing to analyze the role of resource
misallocation in accounting for cross-country productivity differences. By apply-
ing the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model of resource misallocation to a broad
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Only capital distortion
FIGURE 3. Efficiency of resource allocation and GDP per capita – single distortion measures.
See Table 2 for the country names corresponding to the acronyms. The solid drawn line
is the ordinary least squares regression line; the dashed line is the regression line where
observations are weighted by the number of firm observations. See also Table 2.
set of countries, we have provided new evidence on the importance of resource
misallocation for aggregate productivity differences and the cross-country pattern
of misallocation. The goal of covering a wide range of countries led us to use
survey data, rather than industrial censuses, but we have shown that our results
are reliable despite the typically smaller sample sizes. We have also shown that
the size–productivity covariance measure favored by Bartelsman et al. (2013) to
reflect the efficiency of resource allocation shows a broadly comparable cross-
country picture, despite large differences in assumptions between the Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) and Bartelsman et al. (2013) models. One caveat—which we share
with many other studies in this area—is that our data do not cover informal or
the very smallest formal manufacturing firms. But although this caveat limits the
scope of our findings, our results still point to important potential productivity
gains from improving the efficiency of resource allocation.
We find that misallocation of resources between formal manufacturing firms
leads to substantially lower manufacturing productivity levels. If resources were
allocated efficiently, the marginal product of capital and labor would be equal
across firms in an industry, allowing the more productive firms to grow at the
expense of their less productive counterparts. In this hypothetically efficient set-
ting, productivity gaps relative to the United States would shrink substantially but
remain large: the average manufacturing productivity level across 52 countries
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would increase from 23 to 37% of the U.S. level. Resource misallocation across
firms within industries is thus important, yet not the main factor that can explain
low manufacturing productivity levels across developing economies. This suggests
a role for institutional factors, slow technology adoption, human capital externali-
ties, misallocation of resources across sectors or across formal and informal firms,
or any of the other factors that have been associated with productivity differences
in the literature.
The second result is that low-income countries do not have most to gain from
improving the efficiency of resource allocation. We find that the correlation be-
tween the efficiency of resource allocation and GDP per capita is not significant
and this result, like the first one, is robust to alternative choices on measuring
the efficiency of resource allocation. This result calls for more research on the
determinants of resource allocation. The large potential productivity gains from
improving the efficiency of resource allocation implies that policies that succeed
in unlocking those gains are well worth having, yet such efforts should not be
concentrated only in the lowest-income countries.
We find that distortions to the size distribution of firms are of main importance,
so identifying barriers to firm growth, such as complex labor regulations or tax
codes, would be important. Furthermore, though our findings could not shed light
on the allocation of resources between the formal and informal manufacturing
sectors, it seems plausible that barriers to firm growth among formal firms could
also influence the choice to remain informal. This would be an area where greater
availability of basic data would be of great benefit. As it stands, we hope that the
estimates of the efficiency of resource allocation presented in this paper will serve
as a useful point of reference for future research.
NOTES
1. See, e.g., Basu and Fernald (2002), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Jones (2011, 2013), and Bartels-
man et al. (2013) on this specific topic and Syverson (2011) on how this discussion fits in the broader
productivity literature.
2. The WBES surveys were held in the years between 2002 and 2010, so 2005 is a central year.
3. Based on the Penn World Table (PWT), version 8.0, for 2005 [Feenstra et al. (2015)].
4. This follows an approach similar to that of Inklaar and Timmer (2014) and is consistent with
the most recent version of the PWT [Feenstra et al. (2015)].
5. Brazil ranks 159th out of 189 countries on “Paying Taxes” in the World Bank’s (2014) Doing
Business ranking. Muendler (2004) and De Vries (2014) provide analyses of resource misallocation in
Brazil.
6. Note that the results of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) also rely on a data set that excludes small
and/or informal firms.
7. Note that the efficiency of resource allocation in (1) is the inverse of the TFP gains measure
presented by Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
8. See Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for the precise aggregator functions.
9. Based on the median elasticity of substitution estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) for their
most recent period.
10. Because of missing input–output data, we assume that the price for manufacturing output equals
the price for manufacturing value added. The results of Inklaar and Timmer (2014) provide some
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support for this assumption, as in their data, the correlation between the output and value-added prices
is very high.
11. Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012) assume that the share of each sector in total labor input equals
the share in labor compensation, which is equivalent to assuming the same wage across sectors.
12. Specifically, we multiply exchange rate-converted GDP at current prices by PWT’s labor share
in GDP and divide by the number of workers times the human capital index relative to the United
States.
13. If the lending rate is missing, the yield on treasury bonds or bills (also from the International
Financial Statistics) is used.
14. The use of the lending rate means we rely on an external rate of return. The alternative would
be to choose the rate of return to exhaust the fraction of GDP not paid out as labor compensation, but
such an internal rate of return has a number of practical drawbacks [see Inklaar (2010)].
15. In addition to Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Fernald and
Neiman (2011) also use U.S. cost shares as a (relatively) undistorted measure of output elasticities.
16. Appendix Table A.1 shows the elasticities for individual manufacturing industries. The manu-
facturing capital share of 40.6% exceeds the 33% of Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008, Table 1), in part
because of the rising U.S. capital share [Elsby et al. (2013)] and in part because our focus is on cost
shares of manufacturing firms instead of cost shares from producing manufacturing products.
17. Data from ILO (2013) suggest that the informal sector employs large fractions of the total
workforce in many countries, but typically contributes less to GDP, which could imply resource
misallocation between formal and informal manufacturing.
18. A full description of the sampling procedure can be found at www.enterprisesurveys
.org/methodology.
19. This compares with a median level of GDP per capita of $ 6,573 across all 167 countries in
PWT.
20. Specifically, we use the difference of 42.9% between observed and efficient TFP for 1997 from
Hsieh and Klenow (2009, Table IV).
21. The results presented in Bartelsmanet al. (2009, Figure 1.9) for 18 countries across a wide range
of income levels point to a similar conclusion.
22. Using observed manufacturing TFP levels leads to a very similar figure and subsequent results.
23. The correlation of the firm–labor productivity covariance and the “only output distortions”
measure is 0.51 and the correlation with the “only capital distortions” measure is –0.16.
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TABLE A.1. Elasticity parameters for measuring misallocation


















Note: For a few countries in the WBES data set, the 2-digit industrial classifications of industries with
ISIC codes 21–22, 25–26, and 27–29 are not known beyond that level of aggregation. In these cases,
the average value of the share of labor and capital for the respective 2-digit ISIC industries is used.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), averaged over the years 2002–2010.
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TABLE A.2. Efficiency of resource allocation in China and India
(United States = 1)
This paper Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
China 0.70 0.77
India 0.62 0.63
Notes: The efficiency of resource allocation according to this paper is from Table A.1 and refers
to data for 2003 in the case of China and 2002 in the case of India. The efficiency of resource
allocation implied by the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) results is based on their Table IV, which shows
how China’s TFP in 2005 would increase by 43.7% relative to the United States and how India’s
TFP would increase by 84.6% relative to the United States in 1994. The efficiency of resource
allocation relative to the United States is computed as (1 + U.S. TFP gain)/(1 + country TFP gain).
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100515000668
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Groningen, on 31 Mar 2017 at 17:05:27, subject to the Cambridge Core
